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The Rise and Pall of Civilian Government 
Once, it seems, armed conquerors personally ran almost every 
government worthy of the name anywhere in the world. Conquest 
created government, and armed might held it in place. Then, 
fitfully and painfully, rulers fashioned civilian government: 
Warriors dismounted; kings, priests, and their lieutenants fought 
less or no at all; vassals and hirelings carried on the work of 
conquest and control. Over the centuries after 1500, western 
sovereigns brought these processes to their paradoxical height. 
The making of war created the structures of national states. Yet 
as big, destructive wars called forth the mobilization of ever 
more men, food, weapons, ammunition, uniforms, horses, lodgings, 
and cash, corps of non-soldiers arose to manage that mobilization. 
Thus the very changes that permitted western states to wage war on 
a previously unimaginable scale ' and to extend their military 
conquests throughout the world also created bulky, powerful 
civilian staffs, as well as armies subordinate to the holders of 
land and capital. Within limits, large-scale war civilianized 
western states. 
Our twentieth century compounded the paradox. On one side, 
open military conquest of one government by another declined. 
Although twentieth-century wars wroughly incalculable damage and 
displaced people as never before, the race for direct territorial 
expansion slowed. Although econom'ic control of land, labor, and 
capital in one country by people in another country may well have 
increased, it became unusual for one government to pass formally 
into the control of another. 
As the twentieth century moved on, the great colonial powers 
stabilized their overseas rule, shifted toward the establishment 
of civilian government in their colonies and dependencies, then -- 
however reluctantly -- participated in the creation of formally 
autonomous states on the sites of their former empires, What is 
more, those new states typically emerged with formal structures 
greatly resembling those of their former overlords: constitutions, 
representatjve institutions, civilian bureaucracies, non-military 
. . 
executive bfficers, subordinated armies, Even those states in 
which soldiers ruled directly justified their rule as a transition 
to stable democracy, Almost everyone honored civilian rule in 
principle .. 
Yet the lqng-term trend toward civilian government reversed 
itself, In the former colonial areas of Latin America, the Middle 
East, Africa, and Asia, the coup d'e'tat became the standard form 
of governmental succession. In those regions, professional 
soldiers -- often men trained in the military. schools and armies 
of the great colonial powers -- increasingly took direct control 
of. the state, Models of westernized civilian control such as 
Nigeria and Burma moved into the ranks of military states. As of 
1981, by one count, armed forces dominated 54 of the world's 141 
independent states. Those states concentrated almost entirely in 
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and the 
Pacific (Sivard 1981:7). By Samuel Finer's more stringent 
criteria for military rule, 35 states qualified as of the late 
1970s; those 35 followed essentially the same geography as 
Sivard's 54 (Finer 1982). 
After World War 11, the great western powers became more and 
more heavily involved in shipping arms to the new states, in 
,training their armies, and in influencing their military policies. 
Between 1960 and 1980, world arms exports tripled. =The Warsaw 
Pact and NATO powers ended up shipping about the same quantity of 
arms to the rest of the world; between them, they accounted for 
about nine tenths of the world's arms exports (Sivard 1981: 6). 
Over the same two decades, NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces 
declined slightly. in numbers, and their combined military 
expenditures in constant dollars increased by less than 50 
percent. In the rest of the world, armed forces increased by 
about half and military expenditures roughly quadrupled. 
Three crucial changes occurred: 1) The whole world shifted to 
more expensive varieties of armament. 2) Armed forces grew 
disproportionately outside of Europe and North America. 3) 
European and North American powers specialized increasingly in 
arming other states. They not only shipped arms, but also 
organized and trained national armed forces. 
The USA and the USSR, in particular, became the great 
entrepreneurs of armed forces throughout the world. No other 
states came close to their efforts. Military support, at a price, 
became an even larger part of great-power foreign policy. These 
reversals threatened to remil itar ize the great powers themselves. 
As Table 1 shows, the regions of the world with very high military 
expenditures per capita were North America, the Warsaw Pact 
region, the Middle East, and NATO Europe. In terms of proportion 
of Gross National Product spent on military activity, the Middle 
East led the rank order, but the Warsaw Pact and North America 
followed. Rich countries were spending more on military might, 
both absolutely and proportionately. However, they were spending 
it increasingly on arming the rest of the world. 
Since these matters are easily misunderstood, let me state 
clearly what I am saying, and what I am not  saying. Above all, I 
am not  proposing a contrast between an "orderlyn, "gradualn, 
"peacefuln path to the state in Europe and a "rapidn, "turbulentn, 
"violentn path elsewhere. On the contrary: European states took 
shape through external war and internal coercion. After 1500 or 
so, the national states of western ~ u r o ~ e  and its extensions 
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became the world's most powerful organizations. Within those 
powerful states, their armies were long the most extensive, 
costly, and powerful structures. The states competed with each 
other by means of war followed by economic exploitation, and by 
means of economic exploitation backed by the threat of armed 
force. From around 1500 to 1900, the survivors of competition 
within Europe increasingly extended the same combination of 
conquest and commerce to other parts of the world. 
Building of armed forces involved managers of national states 
in struggles to wrest the wherewithal of war from a generally 
reluctant population within their own territories. In the 
process, more or less inadvertently, the managers of national 
states created most of the apparatus we now think of as central to 
those states: the apparatus of tax-collection, of budgeting, of 
supply, of surveillance, of control. The struggle also hammered 
out bargains between statemakers and the subject population: some 
limits on the state's power to tax, some forms of representation 
vis vis the sovereign, some reinforcement of the local 
institutions -- assemblies, systems of landholding, courts, gilds, 
communities -- that played parts in the state's extraction of 
resources for war. 
Thus formed strong, centralized national states with at least 
a modicum of popular participation. In that sense, warmaking 
created national states as we know them. From beginning to end, 
then, the creation and use of armed force remained central to the 
activity of states. By the twentieth century, successful 
statemakers were waging ferocious wars on an international scale. 
Yet, paradoxically, the creation of support structures for the 
state's armed force civilianized domestic political 
administration. Increasingly, the day-to-day operation of the 
national state on its own ground fell into the hands of 
non-military people. The dominant classes and the managers of the 
state withdrew more and more from personal involvement in war and 
in the display of armed force; more and more they entrusted those 
- 
activities to; specialists, to professional soldiers. Soldiers, 
however, became ever more dependent on their civilian supporters 
for the wherewithal of war. The net effect of these changes was 
not to diminish the importance of war or armed force, but to 
decrease the autonomy and personal power of the men who actually 
wielded armed force. 
In that light, the twentieth-century experiences of Latin 
- -  America, the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia look strange. 
For in those parts of the world, military men have not lost 
autonomy and personal power. If anything, they have gained 
strength. AS  able 2 shows, both the frequency of coups and the 
success rates of coups increased in almost all Third World regions 
Table 2. Coups dlEtat in Third World Regions, 1945-1972 
1945-59 1960-72 % of Governments 
Number N d r  Percent Number Percent Military 
Reg ion of States' of Coups Success of Coups Success in 1981 
Central America 9 8 12.5 23 47.8 55.5 
Caribbean 6 2 0.0 2 50.0 33.3 
South America 9 19 21.1 27 40.7 66.7 
Mainland Asia 18 12 41.7 21 42.9 61.1 
Pacific 8 4 75.0 5 60.0 25.0 
Middle East 16 20 35.0 57 52.6 25.0 
Subsaha ran 38 ? ? 78 59.0 60.5 
Africa 
(Source: Compiled from lists in Kennedy 1974) 
between 1945-59 and 1960-72; by 1981, the majority of governments 
were military-run in most Third World regions. If anyone still 
believes that Third World states are essentially recapitulating 
the statemaking experiences of western Europe and its extensions, 
the increasing visibility of soldiers in the politics of those 
Third World states should give the believer pause. 
Why might' that be? Let me confess at once that I know too 
little Third World history and social structure to offer a 
convincing answer to such a large question. Let me concede 
immediately that the proper way to search for an answer passes 
through soundly-documented historical comparisons. Let me grant 
- without complaint that the nations of the Third World vary far too 
much in wealth, size, and history to permit any single explanation 
to cover most of their experiences. Let me admit without delay 
that I write as a student of western European history confronting 
a perplexing fact: The rest of the world is not recapitulating 
Europe's experience. - Why should the world be so uncooperative? 
The point of my speculations, then, will be to see whether 
variation within Europe, properly understood, provides any insight 
into variation in the contemporary world. My main speculation 
will follow this line: To the extent that a state builds up its 
military power through the direct wresting of military means from' 
its own subject population, it creates barriers to military rule. 
to the extent that a state depends on other states for its 
military organization and personnel, it becomes vulnerable to 
military rule. 
Creation and Extension of the European System of States 
Let us consider an organization to be a national state to the 
extent that it a) controls the principal concentrated means of 
coercion in a bounded and contiguous territory larger than a 
single city and its hinterland, b) claims the right to control the 
movement of people and goods across its boundary, c) is formally 
centralized, differentiated, and autonomous. A full-fledged 
national state, by such a definition, lives with a fairly clear 
b - 
distinction between "internal" and "external" political arenas. 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, by such a definition, 
none of the larger ~uropean' powers had become a full-fledged 
national state. On one side, in 1500 every nominal monarch faced 
great lords who operated their own private armies, police forces, 
and systems of justice, and whose cooperation the monarch had 
somehow to enlist in order to carry on repression within the 
territory and war :with other monarchs outside it. On the other, 
so-called national territories were commonly discontinuous, 
divided by enclaves of alien power, and bounded only 
approximately. 
Over the next two hundred years, royal conquests -- both 
"insiden and "outsiden the national territory -- deeply altered 
that situation, By 1700, most of western Europe mapped into 
bounded, contiguous territories within which a single relatively 
centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organization 
controlled the principal concentrated means of coercion, The 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then, brought the heyday of 
statemaking in western Europe. 
As that process went on, the managers of different states 
regularized their relations to ' each other, increasingly 
differentiating their treatment of other people according to 
whether they were a) citizens of their own state, b) citizens of 
another state,. c) officials or representatives of their own state, - 
d) officials or representatives of another state. One can 
reasonably say that not merely a congeries, but a system of 
interdependent national states, confirming each other's 
sovereignty, came into being. 
Three kinds-of relations linked the system of states. First, 
there were the flows of resources in the form of loans and 
supplies, especially loans and supplies devoted to warmaking, 
Second, there was the competition among states for hegemony in 
disputed territories; although that competition obviously divided 
particular pairs of states, other states acted to contain the 
conflict and to influence its outcome. Third, there was the 
intermittent creation of coalitions of states that temporarily 
combined their efforts to force a given state into a certain form 
and a certain position within the international system. The 
warmaking coalition is one example, the peacemaking coalition 
another. 
Peacemaking coalitions were probably the more important; from 
1648, with the settlement of the Thirty Years War, we find all 
effective European states coalescing temporarily- to bargain out 
the boundaries and rulers of the recent belligerents -- especially 
the losers, when one state clearly defeated another. From that 
point on, the major reorganizations of the European state system 
came in spurts, at the settlements of widespread wars. From each 
large war, in general, emerged fewer national states than had 
entered it. The international compact of interested states, 
having negotiated the new boundaries and rulers, acquired a 
commitment to maintain both of them, or at least to defend them 
against the maneuvers of other states. 
This does not mean states developed a commitment to peace. 
On the contrary, war became the normal condition of the 
international system of states. War became the normal, means of 
defending or enhancing a position within the system. Why war? No 
simple answer will do; war, as a potent means, served more than 
one end. But surely part of the answer goes back to the central 
mechanisms of statemaking: The very logic by which a local lord 
extended or defended the perimeter within which he monopolized the 
means of violence, and thereby increased his return from that 
monopoly, continued on a larger scale into the logic of war. 
Early in the process, external and internal rivals overlapped to a 
large degree. Only the establishment of large perimeters of 
control within which great lords had checked their rivals 
sharpened the line between internal and external. Then the 
existence of a system of states became a greater advantage, since 
in the process of conquest a ruler could bargain out not only the 
acquiescence of people in the conquered territories, but also the 
assent of those who ran adjacent states, Thus- developed the 
practical definition of legitimacy that prevails among states 
today: willingness of subject populations to accept a state's 
commands, coupled with readiness of neighboring states to enforce 
those commands when asked, 
Whether they contested' or assented, furthermore, the 
interaction of those adjacent states with a conquering state 
tended to make them more similar to the conqueror: Either they 
adopted some of the same organization for war, or they borrowed 
models of administration for peace, or both. When states 
concerted among themselves, in peace or in war, -they tended to 
force upon other states that fell within their zones of control 
the forms of government they preferred. A transition occurred: 
From a situation in which states took shape mainly through a great 
lord's own efforts to conquer or check adjacent competitors, 
Europe moved to a situation in which existing states, in concert, 
played a large part in creating or reorganizing other states. 
Roughly speaking, a transition from internal toward external 
processes of statemaking. 
With due recognition that the distinction between internal 
and external processes is fragile and arbitrary, we might 
schematize European statemaking's history as three stages: 
1. The differential success of some powerholders in 
"external" struggles establishes the difference between 
an "internaln and an "external" arena for the deployment 
of force. 
2. "External" competition generates "internal" 
statemaking. 
3. "External" compacts among states influence the form 
and locus of particular states ever more powerfully. 
With renewed - caution, we might then think of France and 
England as states that took shape mainly in the first stage 
of the process, of Norway and Austria as states showing 
significant impact of the first two stages, of Finland, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the two Germanies -- despite 
glorious earlier experiences of pristine statemaking -- as 
states whose current structure shows clear effects of the 
third stage, of compacts among many other states. 
In this perspective, state-certifying organizations such 
as the League of Nations and the United Nations simply 
extended the European-based process to the world as a whole. 
Whether forced or voluntary, bloody or peaceful, 
decolonization simply completed the process by which existing 
states leagued to create new ones. 
Does Europe Predict the  Third World's Future? 
As a model for the formation of national states in the 
rest of the world, it turns out, European experience offers 
an ambiguous lesson. On the one hand, with generations of 
- 
western political analysts;, we might consider the pristine 
European statemaking experiiences -- those of France, England, 
Spain, perhaps Brandenburg-Prussia or Sweden -- the proper 
and probable models for the rest of the world. On the other, 
we might reason from the same experience that 1) the forms of 
particular states tend to crystallize at well-defined moments 
of strenuous organization or reorganization, then to change 
only slowly and in secondary ways between such heroic 
moments, 2) where the last such moment appeared with respect 
to the development of the whole system of states deeply 
affects their present form, and, more precisely, 3) since 
1500 or so, the more recent that heroic moment of 
crystallization, the stronger the impact of other states' 
bargaining with respect to the form of the state in question, 
Although I began my own explorations of European statemaking 
with a naive hope that some version of the first might be 
true, I now think that if the European experience in forming 
national states has any relevance for the current experience 
of the Third World, it must be through the second and third 
lines of reasoning, 
Certainly the extension of the Europe-based statemaking 
process to the rest of the world did not create states in the 
strict European image, Broadly speaking, in Europe internal 
struggles such as the checking of great regional lords and 
the imposition of taxation on peasant villages produced 
important organizational features of states: not only the 
relative subordination of military power to civilian control, 
but also the extensive bureaucracy of fiscal surveillance, 
the representation of wronged interests via petition and 
parliament, and the reinforcement of the local community as a 
fundamental unit of government. Some European states lay far 
outside this process, and proved vulnerable to military 
takeovers. Portugal, Spain, and Greece are the prominent 
twentieth-century examples, One might likewise make a case 
for the France of 1958, although the final result of de 
Gaulle's arrival in power was another round of 
civilianization. 
On the whole, states elsewhere developed differently. 
In general, the more recent a state's creation, the more 
likely that other states had fixed and guaranteed its 
external boundaries and played a direct part in the 
designation of its rulers, the less likely that those rulers 
faced well-organized internal rivals other than their own 
military forces. An initial coalition government such as 
that of Zimbabwe is the exception, not the rule. 
The most telling feature of that difference appears in - 
military ; organization. European states built up their 
military apparatuses through sustained struggles with their 
I 
subject' populations, and by means of selective extension of 
protection to different classes within those populations. 
Agreements on protection constrained the rulers themselves, 
making them vulnerable to courts, to assemblies, to 
withdrawals of credit, services, and expertise. 
To a larger degree, states that have come into being 
recently through decolonization or through reallocations of 
territory by dominant states have acquired their military 
organization from outside, without the same internal forging 
of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled. To the 
extent that outside states continue to supply military goods 
and expertise in return for commodities, or military 
alliance, or both, the new states harbor powerful, 
unconstrained organizations which easily overshadow all other 
organizations within their territories. To the extent that 
outside states guarantee their boundaries, the managers of 
those military organizations exercise extraordinary power 
within them. The advantages of military power become 
enormous, the incentives to seize power over the state as a 
whole by means of that advantage very strong. 
The apparent exceptions are those states, such as - 
Angola, brought into independence by coalitions elf guerrilla 
forces each supported by different external powers, and each 
retaining a degree of autonomy past the moment of the state's 
independence. Within a new state, a unified military 
organization gives its commanders enormous leverage. Despite 
the great place that warmaking occupied in the making of 
European states, the old national states of Europe almost 
never experienced the great disp~oportion between military 
organization and all other forms of organization that seems 
the fate of client states throughout the contemporary world. 
In our own time, not all states entering the Europe 
based system of states have been clients and not all have . 
17 
been equally vulnerable to military control. As a first 
attempt to reason from possible lessons of the European 
experience to alternative paths through the contemporary 
world, let me propose a simple fourfold classification. As 
usual, the four categories result from arbitrarily cutting 
each of two continua in half. The continua a.re: a) the 
extent to which a state's military organization is created, 
trained, staffed, and supplied by other states: internal vs. 
external; b) the extent to which the resources to support 
military organization are generated directly by the export of 
labor or commodities to one other country: dependent vs. 
independent. 
DEPENDENCE ON EXPORTS TO A SINGLE 
COUNTRY FOR MILITARY RESOURCES 
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT 
SOURCE 
EXTERNAL client states e.g. clones e.g. 
OF Honduras South Korea 
MILITARY 
o m -  
INTERNAL merchants e .g . autonomous states e.g. 
Iraq China, South Africa 
ZATION 
In general, runs the reasoning, states that acquire their 
military organization, training, personnel, and supplies from 
outside powers are less likely to have struggled through ,to 
civilian constraints on their own armed forces. The table 
also indicates that a state depending on exports to a single 
destination for the funds paying for its armed force is 
deeply vulnerable to outside in£ luence, because fluctuations 
in the target country's economy affect its own ability to 
sustained armed force so directly, and because the receiving 
state can so easily influence the sending state's welfare by 
manipulating the terms of trade. If we take European 
experience seriously, we should expect client states to 
follow signals from their patrons, clones to be especially 
vulnerable to military coups, merchants to wax and wane as a 
function of the market for their commodities or labor, and 
autonomous states to occupy similar positions to the old 
members of the European state-system. 
Over the last century or so, our world has seen a 
decisive net shift from the lower right-hand corner of the 
diagram to ' the upper left-hand ' corner: from internal 
creation, staffing, and supplying of military organization by 
states depending rather little on exports to a single trading 
partner toward a situation in which military forms, 
personnel, and supplies flow into a state while exports flow 
out to a single destination and pay for the military 
wherewithal. The twentieth-century drive of great powers to 
surround themselves with rings of poorer, militarily 
dependent states fosters just such a shift. 
Tables 3 and 4 display some outcomes of that process. 
Their categories, regrettably, do not correspond to those of 
my diagram; for that, we would need information about 
expor t-dependency and about the sources of military 
organization and training. They do, however, provide a 
preliminary indication of the dependence of states in 
different parts of the Third World on arms imports for their 
own military. The first fact to note is that three-fifths of 
the world's states having military rule in 1981 also relied 
on a single supplier for the great bulk of their arms. Latin 
America, where the U.S. had eight clients while the U.S.S.R. 
supplied Cuba, led the pack. Middle Eastern states, although 
great consumers of arms,. managed to diversify their sources 
of supply; both their oil revenues and their geopolitical 
position probably helped that endeavor. Asian states, 
nevertheless, were the ones most heavily involved in 
international military networks. Over 55 percent of all 
Asian states had military rulers, while almost 70 percent had 
either military rule, or heavy arms shipments, or .both. In 
terms of per capita expenditures for military activity, the 
Middle Eastern states overshadowed all the rest. On the 





Asia - America Africa Total 
Mil-itary Rule, 
One Big Supplier 23.5 34.8 37.5 27.3 30.6 
Military Rule, 
Several Suppliers 5.9 21.7 16.7 25.0 19.4 
Non-Military, 
Heavy Arms Imports 29.4 13.0. 8.3 6.8 12.0 
Other 41.2 30.4 37.5 40.9 38.0 
Number of States 17 23 24 44 108 
Definitions: - - 
One Big Supplie~: Che state supplies at least 75 percent of the state's arms 
imports. 
Heavy Arms Imports: State imports at least 8.5 billion dollars worth of arms in 
year . 
(Source: Sivard 1981) 
average, non-military states outspent military states, a fact 
which suggests that military rulers benefited more 
significantly from the protection and subsidy of great powers 
than did their civilian-led neighbors. Not the sheer level 
of military expenditure, but the relationship between 
military forces and other organizations, appears to have 
forwarded or checked military hegemony. 
If the building up of circles of dependents around the 
great powers were the only trend, to be sure, the world would 
divide neatly into autonomous states and clients; clones and ' 
merchants would not exist. But the world actually contains 
some clones, and plenty of merchants. Competiti6n among the 
great commercial and military powers has made it possible for 
some states to bargain their strategic locations into claims 
on extensive military support from another power, and thus to 
become clones, while states having their own. military 
establishments-as well as a valuable export have bartered the 
export for military supplies, thus becoming merchants. 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, all of which enjoy extensive 
military protection while spending exceptionally low shares 
of their national income on military might, show some of the 
advantages of cloning. 
In the light of European experience, merchants -- 
Table 4. Military Expenditure per Capita in Third World Regions, by Type of 
Regime, 1981 . 
Reg ion 
Middle Latin 
East - Asia - Oceania America Africa 
~ i l  i tary Rule, 
One Big Supplier 114 32 20 31 
Military Rule, 
Several Suppliers 52 22 40 7 
Non-Military, 
Heavy Arms Imports 402 25 28 44 
Other 574 142 80 13 19 
Percent of GNP in 
Military Expenditure 12.2 2.8 2.4 1.5 3.6 
. (Source: Sivard 1981). 
especially, in our own time, exporters of oil -- pose some 
especially interesting questions. To the extent that their 
buyers league to form a single bloc, they become as 
vulnerable as a country'having but one destination for its 
exports. Their situation most resembles that of Spain when 
riches were flowing in from America. On the one hand, when 
demand for their exports is high, they avoid much of the 
statemaking effort, and the consequent fighting out of 
agreements with major classes in their own territories, that 
so marked European preparation for war, That side of the 
equation suggests the possibility of an acquiescent 
population, and a relatively"peacefu1 exercise of power by 
those who control the essential commodities, On the other, 
their military organizations acquire a fearsome power 
relative to other organizations in their vicinities. Where 
it is technically possible for the same small group to seize 
control of the military apparatus and the sources of exports, 
we should witness an incentive to military coups that will 
outshadow the petty maneuvers of the clones, 
Where the export is extremely valuable, as in the case 
of oil, we might expect the great powers themselves to 
support military factions that a) show promise of being able 
both to seize control of the state and to assure the 
continuation of the export, b) are willing to barter a 
promise to export to the great power for support from that 
great power. 
What will happen if and when the merchants' income 
rises? Two complementary dangers arise. The first is that 
merchant states will build their military might to 
unprecedented levels, thus increasing the stakes in domestic 
struggles for power and the destructiveness of international 
war. The second is that their demand for arms will feed the 
military industries of the great powers, thereby promoting 
the remili tarization of the great powers themselves. Today's 
large shipments of American, Russian, and French weaponry to 
various Middle Eastern states augur ill for peace -- domestic 
or international -- in that troubled region. Increased 
military power there and elsewhere in the Third World 
provides no guarantee of stable government or nonviolent 
settlement of international disputes. 
GENERAL NOTE: This is a revised version of "Speculations on 
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